

# WSG MEETING OF THE AMERICAS



## MIAMI, FLORIDA



**MOORE STEPHENS**

Cifuentes, Lemus & Asociados, S.C.  
RIF J-00296621-1



# **Cyber Security – International Technology Intelligence and Info Management**

GUEST SPEAKER PRESENTATION

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# **2014 Cybersecurity Guidance to Professional Services Firms**



# Four Part Outline

1. Anatomy of a Computer Intrusion: How Kroll Hacked a Professional Services Firm
2. Top 10 Mistakes Companies Make When Preparing For and Responding to a Breach
3. Top 5 Mitigation Techniques Against Targeted Attacks
4. Case Study of an Insider Attack and the Use of Multifaceted Investigative Techniques

Download this presentation at:

<http://information.kroll.com/timryan>

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# **Anatomy of a Computer Intrusion: How Kroll Hacked a Professional Services Firm**



# How Kroll Cyber Security Broke into a Professional Services Firm

- Kroll was retained to breach the IT network of ACME Widgets to demonstrate how the company was susceptible to attacks.
- Kroll received the consent of the target company's management.
- ACME Widgets normal website was: ACME.com
- Kroll purchased the name ACME.co for about \$10.

# ACME.co

What Kroll did:

- Created ACME.co to look exactly like ACME.com
- Created the ACME login page
- Used LinkedIn to find employees of ACME.
- Reviewed the ACME website to create a password reset email

# The Phish and Intrusion

- Sent the email to employees and had them “reset” their passwords into the fake ACME site. At this point we had a lot of usernames and passwords.
- With the “stolen” passwords Kroll gained access to corporate workstations, emails, and the company Intranet. Kroll also placed temporary backdoors on the machines so that a password reset would not lock us out.
- During the breach, Kroll had access to corporate legal information, client data, and M&A data.
- Kroll exported the entire company directory (over 7,000 employees) to target additional employees.



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# **Top 10 Mistakes Companies Make When Preparing For and Responding to a Breach**



# Escalation and Employee Security Awareness

- Define how incidents should be reported and escalated
- Case: Intrusion identified 2 months prior to significant destruction

# The Need to Preserve Evidence: Competing Interests between Get it Working Again and Preserving Evidence

- The hotel room murder where the hotel cleans everything up and notifies later.

# The Ability to Preserve Evidence: Forensic Collection Capabilities

- Many firms can make images but their ability to analyze is not sufficient.
- How to make images in a forensically sound manner versus how the sys admin normally does it.
- How to scale the investigation.
- Comparison of old methods versus current continuous monitoring and diagnostics

# The Ability to Demand Evidence: Third Parties

- Must your vendors tell you when they give your data to another vendor?
- Must your cloud providers tell you when there is a breach?
- Must they give you the evidence?
- Had one that demanded legal process.

# Log Creation and Centralization

- What and Where are logs
- Why they matter
- Why centralization helps

# Internal Conflicts of Interest: IT versus Security

- Organizational structure may encourage and allow a white wash
- Mechanic versus investigator

# Network Visibility and Architecture

- The unknown server is hard to hard to protect.
- Can you see connections between computers



# Containment and Eradication Strategy

- Unable to identify binaries throughout the enterprise
- Unable to rapidly segment the network

# Incident Response Plan

- Actions, People, Place, Tools, Policies

# Backups

- Tested
- Backups to respond to data destruction
- Ransomware is proliferating. Backups is one of the only ways to recover if you can't prevent it.

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# Top 5 Mitigation Techniques Against Targeted Attacks



# Top 5 Mitigation Techniques

- Patching OS
- Patching Third Party Software
  - » Java
  - » Adobe Reader
  - » Flash
  - » Web Browser
- Restriction on Administrative Rights
- Application Whitelisting
- Two Factor Authentication for Remote Connections

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# **Case Study of an Insider Attack and the Use of Multifaceted Investigative Techniques**



# Why This Case Is Important



- Forensics alone won't solve the problem.
- Incident Response should look to mitigate damage by dealing with both the technology and the criminal.
- Incident responders should be both technically proficient and trained in investigations.

# The Company: ACME Logic

- Very profitable financial institution using proprietary algorithms
- Had strong information and physical security measures. VDI, multifactor authentication, biometric physical access controls, CCTV.
- Incident response was not as developed as were the security controls.





# What was Reported to Kroll

- AV alert: Attached USB
- CCTV review showed Joe over 2 weekends
- Joe had been fired
- How he got in



# Scope and Complications

- What the company wanted Kroll to determine
- Complicating factors



# What was Known About the Subject

- Joe had been employed by the company for approximately 2 years.
- Had low work performance.
- Was a foreign national in the US on a work visa.



# How Kroll Responded

- Initial Forensics
- Search of his former work space
- Phone and email logs
- CCTV Review
- The Ruse



# The Ruse

- Designed to enlist the subject's cooperation
- Consent to enter his house
- Obtain the data he took from the company



# Introduction, Interview, and Confrontation

- CEO warm up
- Introduction of Kroll
- Minimization of conduct
- Use of confrontation material



# Confession and Consent

- Joe confessed to taking the papers
- I advised that we needed to retrieve the papers from his house.
- He consented.
- Once we had the papers I told him he had to hand over the USB drives.

# Second Interview

- Centered on motivation and corroboration.
- Refused to discuss previous employment





# Forensic Review and Findings

- Immediate access by the company
- Nature and extent of information was determined.
- Algorithms were the target.
- Kroll's finding: the data was copied but never accessed.

# Conclusion

- The CEO advised that the company had “dodged a \$30 million bullet”
- The proprietary data was recovered.



# Thank You

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